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Abstract
Are monetary and non-monetary incentives used as substitutes in motivating effort?
I address this question in a laboratory experiment in which the choice of the job charac-
teristics (i.e., the mission) is part of the compensation package that principals can use to
influence agents’ effort. Principals offer contracts that specify a piece rate and a charity—
which can be either the preferred charity of the agent, or the one of the principal. The
agents then exert a level of effort that generates a profit to the principal and a dona-
tion to the specified charity. My results show that the agents exert more effort than the
level that maximizes their own pecuniary payoff in order to benefit the charity, especially
their preferred one. The principals take advantage of this intrinsic motivation by offering
lower piece rates and by using the choice of the charity as a substitute to motivate effort.
However, I also find that because of fairness considerations, the majority of principals are
reluctant to lower the piece rate below a fair threshold, making the substitution between
monetary and non-monetary incentives imperfect. These findings have implications for the
design of incentives in mission-oriented organizations and contribute to our understanding
of job satisfaction and wage differentials across organizations and sectors.
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The design of incentives in organizations has always been at the core of economists’ research
agendas, motivating a large body of the empirical and theoretical literature. To date, however,
most of the economic studies have focused on the design of financial incentives, such as pay-
for-performance contracts and bonus awards. While these incentives can be a powerful tool
in firms where employees’ primary goal is to earn money, they may become less effective—or
even harmful (Benabou and Tirole, 2003)—in organizations where workers perform tasks that
have positive externalities for society, e.g. in organizations involved in the provision of social
goods and services. Workers in these organizations are often driven only partly by financial
rewards, but also by the mission of their job, i.e., by the overall job design and characteristics
and its impact on society. This raises the question of whether principals use the job mission
as a substitute for monetary incentives in eliciting effort from motivated agents. This is the
central question of this paper.
The answer to this question has implications for a wide set of labor market environments,
for instance, for the design of contracts in organizations that are involved in the provision
of social goods and services. Given that many of these organizations do not generate profit
and, therefore, have limited financial resources at their disposal, non-monetary incentives can
play a major role in motivating employees, while, at the same time, reducing the organization’s
financial expenses. If employees care about the mission of their projects, it may be desirable for
an employer to increase the employees’ discretion in designing their own projects even though
their mission preferences may not be perfectly aligned. For example, employees of a non-profit
organization in the field of education may be willing to exert the same level of effort for a lower
wage in order to be able to choose the characteristics of the project on which they work: the
educational curricula that should be taught, the teaching methods that should be used, the
beneficiaries’ targeting, and so on. Such “ideological” issues play an important role in the social
and development sector (Besley and Ghatak, 1999, 2001).
More generally, this analysis has implication for the design of contracts in organizations
where employees solve tasks that involve a certain level of creativity. Motivated journalists,
researchers, architects, and computer engineers, can feel very strongly about the products
they develop and may be willing to give up financial gains in order to decide which news to
cover, which research topics to address, which phone applications to design. Do firms and
organizations such as the New York Times, the World Bank and Apple, take advantage of
this intrinsic motivation when designing their contracts? Google seems to understand how to
make the most of its employees’ intrinsic motivation and mission preferences:“... by allowing
its engineers to spend 20% of their work week on projects that interest them, Google is able to
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tap into the many talents of its employees.”1
I address the above question in a novel laboratory experiment in which the choice of the
job mission is part of the compensation package that a principal can use to motivate an agent.
A laboratory experiment is an appropriate method to address this issue for several reasons.
First, it allows to perfectly control for self-selection of agents with unobservable characteristics.
For example, while a negative wage differential between the public and the private sector
may be consistent with public organizations substituting mission and job design for monetary
compensations, it may also result from workers with higher abilities self-selecting in the private
sector, or from different production functions across sectors. Second, as it will become clearer
from the design description, since the mission preferences of the principals and of the agents
are not perfectly observable, identification must be achieved by comparing the behavior of the
same individuals in different contexts, namely, by a within-subject design. Third, the effort
task must be monetary in order to compare the agents’ effort choices with the exact predictions
made by different theoretical models. Only laboratory data allow one to perfectly control for
all these issues.
In my experiment, pairs of subjects form principal-agent contractual relationships for the
development of a project. The principal offers the agent a contract, which consists of a mission
and a piece rate, to carry out the project. The agent then chooses a monetary effort level that
generates a profit to the principal and a social output. The social output is implemented as
a donation to a charity, while the choice of the project mission is implemented as the choice
of which charity receives the donation. More specifically, the principal can offer two types
of contracts: an open contract, or a closed contract. If the closed contract is offered, the
effort exerted by the agent generates a donation to the principal’s preferred charity. If the
open contract is offered, the effort exerted by the agent generates a donation to the agent’s
preferred charity.2 The agent is paid according to the piece rate specified in the offered contract.
After receiving the contract, the agent chooses his effort level, which determines payoffs and
donations. Thus, the employer cannot contract directly on effort. He can, however, influence
the agent’s effort level through the choice of the piece rate and through the choice of which of
the two types of contract to offer, namely, the mission.
Notice that the choice of the project mission is only relevant if it entails a trade-off for the
principal, namely, if the principal and the agent prefer different charities. If this wasn’t the
1http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurahe/2013/03/29/googles-secrets-of-innovation-empowering-its-employees
2It is worth pointing out that differently from Fehr et al. (2013) and Charness et al. (2012), neither contracts
imply a proper delegation of decision from the principal to the agent. The decision is always made by the
principal about whose preferred charity receives the donation. Thus, this paper is not about the intrinsic value
of authority.
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case, the choice between the open and the closed contract would be trivial and the question of
whether the choice of the project mission is treated as substitute to monetary incentives could
not be addressed. Thus, to generate a pool of subjects who care about different charities, in
the recruitment process students were informed that they would earn slightly less than usual in
experiments but that they would be given the opportunity to generate a substantial donation
to their favorite charity, which had to be specified in advance.3
In order to identify how agents’ intrinsic motivation and mission preferences affect the
contracts offered by the principals, I need to compare contracts offered to motivated agents with
the contracts that the principals would offer if the agents were not intrinsically motivated and,
therefore, did not care about the project mission. For this purpose, the experiment consisted
of two treatments. In the main treatment, the agents were allowed to choose any desired effort
level for any given piece rate. The parameters of the payoff functions were chosen such that an
agent who is intrinsically motivated and thus cares about the charity, would choose an effort
level that is higher than the piece rate offered in the contract. In the control treatment, the
agents were not allowed to choose more effort than the level that maximizes their monetary
payoff. That is, they could not choose an effort level that is higher than the piece rate specified
in the contract. In this treatment any effort premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation was,
therefore, ruled out. The agents had to behave as if they did not care about the charities.
By comparing the piece rates and the frequency of open contracts offered across the two
treatments, I am able to test whether principals treat monetary incentives and the choice of
the project mission as substitutes to elicit effort from motivated agents. If this is the case,
one should observe agents in the main treatment being offered the open contract more often
and being paid less than agents in the control treatment. That is, in the presence of an effort
premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation, principals should be more likely to let the agents
work for their preferred charity and they should offer lower monetary incentives compared to
situations where this effort premium is absent.
The main results are the following: (i) Agents were motivated to generate a donation under
both contracts, but more so when the donation was made to their preferred charity. In other
words, conditional on the piece rate, in the main treatment effort exerted under the open
contract was higher than under the closed contract, and both these efforts were higher than the
effort exerted under any contract in the control treatment. This result shows that the mission
of a job matters for motivated workers: the higher the mission-matching, the higher the effort
3This recruitment procedure has, of course, generated a selected pool of subjects. This selection is, however,
necessary because the underlying theory is about employers and workers who care about the mission of the
project. The design is meant to reflect the environment of mission-oriented organizations rather than purely
profit-driven firms.
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level. (ii) Given a type of contract, open or closed, the piece rates were lower in the main
treatment than in the control treatment. Hence, principals took advantage of the agents’ effort
premium in the main treatment by offering lower monetary incentives. (iii) The open contract
was offered more frequently in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Thus, if
faced with motivated agents who can act on their motivation, principals were more willing to
compromise on the job mission to save on monetary incentives.
These results are further supported when matching subjects’ decisions in the experiment
with their choices from an allocation game, which was run at the end of the experiment to
measure the charity preferences at an individual level. More specifically, I find that the results
apply mainly to those subjects who, according to their decisions in the allocation game, have
a stronger preference for their chosen charity compared to other charities.
Viewed jointly, these findings provide evidence that principals treat the choice of the job
mission as a substitute for monetary incentives, in order to elicit effort from motivated agents.
In the experiment, this resulted in the same realized level of effort across treatments but with
different combinations of incentives. That is, in the main treatment, principals were able to
replace monetary incentives with non-monetary incentives and still induce the same level of
effort as in the control treatment.
I also find, however, that principals were heterogenous in their willingness to substitute
monetary with non-monetary incentives. This heterogeneity was driven by fairness consid-
erations. I find that the high number of principals who, in a postexperiment questionnaire,
reported some fairness concerns about offering a lower wage to a motivated worker, sacrificed
profits because they were reluctant to lower the piece rate below a fair threshold. Thus, these
fairness concerns acted as a limited liability constraint, making the substitution between the
mission and the piece rate imperfect.
The findings of this paper contribute not only to the design of incentives in organizations,
but also to our understanding of job satisfaction and wage differentials across organizations
and sectors. They may help explain, for instance, why firms such as Google may be able to
pay lower wages than their main competitor without becoming any less attractive to talented
employees.4 They may also explain why workers in mission-oriented sectors, such as welfare
and religious services, are paid the lowest wage, but report the highest job satisfaction, across
all sectors Pischke (2011). The results of this paper suggest that this is likely not driven only
4Circumstantial evidence reported in the New York Times suggests that:“...Google pays less and its health
insurance is not as good as Microsoft.” Source: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/google-v-microsoft-
whats-the-better-workplace. Taking a more extreme example, these results provide also an explanation for the
recent empirical evidence in Bahney et al. (2013), which shows that insurgent fighters by Al Qa’ida Iraq are
paid less than their outside options, even when compared to unskilled labor, and receive an estimated negative
risk premium.
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by self-selection of happy workers into these industries, but also by specific non-monetary job
attributes in these sectors which substitute for low income.
The paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it relates to contract theory models
with motivated agents (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007; Cassar, 2014). In
a setting where the job mission is exogenous, Besley and Ghatak (2005) show that it is optimal
for a principal to offer lower monetary incentives if he is matched with an agent who shares
his same mission preferences. Similarly, Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) shows that more motivated
workers imply weaker monetary incentives. In a setting where the choice of a project mission is
endogenous and where the principal and the agent have misaligned mission preferences, Cassar
(2014) shows that it is optimal for the principal to (partly) compromise on the choice of the
mission in order to save on financial payments. Thus, overall, the findings of this paper provide
experimental support for the predictions of these models. Second, the paper relates to previous
experimental studies that show that the matching of the job mission with the workers’ preferred
mission increases effort (Carpenter and Gong, 2013; Gerhards, 2013; Fehrler and Kosfeld, 2013;
Besley and Ghatak, 2013; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2014). These studies, however, only focus
on the behavior of the agents, and do not address the main question of this paper.5 Finally,
the paper points to a different “hidden cost of control” which, contrary to Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) and Bartling et al. (2012, 2013), does not arise from the perception that the lack of
discretion is a signal of the principal’s distrust, but from the fact that motivated workers have
direct preferences on how to solve their tasks, and these preferences are not always aligned with
the ones of their employers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the the-
oretical framework and predictions. Section II describes the experimental design. Section III
presents the results. Section IV discuss some results in more details. Section V concludes.
5Gerhards (2013) also analyzes the principals’ choice and finds that principals pay higher piece rates in
contracts with the agents’ preferred mission than in contracts with a random mission. However, given that in
the design by Gerhards (2013) principals often share the same mission preference as the agents, this may simply
be the result of the employers wanting to elicit more effort for their preferred mission than for a random mission.
Finally, (Nyborg and Zhang, 2013; Nyborg, 2014) shows that firms with a reputation as socially responsible
pay significantly lower wages. These studies, however, only report correlations and cannot make any causal
argument.
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I. Theoretical Framework
I.1. The Model
The theoretical basis for my experimental design is a simple extension, which I describe below,
of the model by Besley and Ghatak (2005) to an environment where the project’s mission is
endogenous and where the principal and the agent have different mission preferences.
An agent is matched with a principal who offers him a contract for the development of a
social project. The contract specifies a wage per unit of effort w , henceforth piece rate, and
a project’s mission m ∈ {mP ,mA}, where mP is the preferred mission of the principal, mA is
the preferred mission of the agent, and mP 6= mA. The agent will then exert a level of effort,
e, to develop the project. The utility of the principal from implementing the contract (w,m)
is equal to
V (e;w,m) = Π(e, w) + γmD(e) m = mA,mP (1)
Π(e) is the profit generated by the project as a function of the agent’s effort. This is composed
of the monetary output minus the piece rate cost. γm is the principal’s valuation for the social
output of a project with mission m, and D(e) is the social output generated by the project as
a function of the agent’s effort. It follows that γmP > γmA ≥ 0, that is, the principal values
more the social output of a project with his preferred mission than with the preferred mission
of the agent. The principal chooses (w,m) that maximizes (1). Given the contract (w,m), the
agent chooses the level of effort that maximizes the following utility:
U(w,m; e) = we+ αmD(e)− C(e) m = mA,mP (2)
where αm is the agent’s intrinsic motivation to develop a project with mission m and C(e) is
the cost of exerting effort, which is equal to 1
2
e2. It follows that αmA > αmP ≥ 0, that is,
the agent’s intrinsic motivation is higher when he works for his preferred mission than for the
preferred mission of the principal. If the agent were not motivated, he would not care about
the project mission, i.e. αmA = αmP = 0.
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I.2. Analysis and Theoretical Implications
For sake of notational clarity, let’s define wm as the piece rate paid to the agent if the project’s
mission m is chosen. Finally, to keep the analysis simple, Π(.) and D(.) can be assumed to be
6Notice that in principle γmA and αmP could also be negative, that is, the principal and the agent could
derive an intrinsic cost from the social output of a project with mission mA and mP respectively. This could be
the case, for instance, if mission preferences reflect different political or religious views, as in Carpenter and Gong
(2013). This would, however, have no fundamental implication for the theoretical predictions. Nevertheless,
since the experiment involves charities rather than political parties, for an illustrative point of view it is easier
to just assume these parameters to be positive.
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linear in effort:
Π(e, w) = (pi − w)e (3)
D(e) = de (4)
The agent’s optimal level of effort is then
e∗m = wm + αmd m = mA,mP (5)
The agent’s optimal level of effort is increasing in the offered piece rate, in the intrinsic motiva-
tion from working in a project with mission m, αm, and in the effort’s productivity in generating
social output, d. Since αmA > αmP , motivated agents exert more effort, for any given piece
rate, in contracts with their preferred mission. Furthermore, this level of effort is higher than
the piece rate. If an agent is not motivated, his optimal level of effort is equal to the piece rate
independently of the project mission. This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction 1 The effort premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation is higher when the agents
work for their preferred mission than for the preferred mission of the principals.
Given the optimal level of effort in (5), the optimal piece rate in a contract with mission m
is equal to
w∗m = Max
{
0 ; 1
2
[pi + d(γm − αm)]
}
m = mA,mP (6)
The optimal piece rate is increasing in the effort’s productivity in generating profit, pi and in
the principal’s valuation of the social output of a project with mission m, γm. This is the
preference channel : everything else being equal, the more the principal cares about the social
output of a project, the higher the effort level he wants to elicit from the agent, and in turn,
the higher the piece rate he will offer in the contract. More importantly for this study, the
optimal piece rate is decreasing in the agent’s intrinsic motivation to work for a project with
mission m, αm. This is the substitution channel : everything else being equal, the higher the
agent’s intrinsic motivation, the more the principal can save on monetary incentives, i.e., the
more he can lower the piece rate. The experiment is designed to identify this channel.
These two channels have three implications for contract design. First, since the preference
channel is stronger under the contract with the principal’s preferred mission (γmP > γmA) while
the opposite holds true for the substitution channel (αmA > αmP ), wages are higher in contracts
with the principal’s preferred mission, i.e. w∗mP > w
∗
mA
. This leads to a negative correlation
between financial incentives and the alignment of the project mission with the agent’s mission
preferences. Second, because of the substitution channel, motivated agents are offered lower
wages compared to non-motivated agents. If αmP > 0, this is true for both project missions.
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Third, this piece rate differential should be higher if the motivated agent works for his preferred
mission, as the substitution channel is stronger in this case. In other words, the principal can
take more advantage of the agent’s intrinsic motivation by lowering the piece rate when the
latter works for his preferred mission. This generates the following prediction(s):
Prediction 2 i) Wages are higher in contracts with the principals’ preferred mission; ii) Mo-
tivated agents are paid less than non-motivated agents; iii) The piece rate differential in ii is
higher if motivated agents work for their preferred mission than for the preferred mission of the
principals.
By replacing the optimal piece rate in the optimal effort function of the agent, I can derive
the optimal level of effort as a function of the exogenous parameters only:
e∗m =
1
2
[pi + d(γm + αm)] m = mA,mP (7)
Equation (7) suggests that for any project mission, the unconditional level of effort is increasing
in both the principal’s valuation for social output and the agent’s intrinsic motivation. Com-
parative statics depend on the specific values taken by γm and αm. Since these parameters
can take any value, I cannot predict whether the unconditional level of effort will be higher
under the contract with the principal’s preferred mission or under the contract with the agent’s
preferred mission. For sufficiently high αmA , however, it is clear that the level of effort will be
higher under the contract with the agent’s preferred mission. Since wages are lower under such
contracts, this can result in a negative correlation between effort and monetary incentive in a
cross-section of organizations.
Finally, I can derive the principal’s utility from each of the two contracts to make predictions
about the optimal choice of the project’s mission. Equation (1) can be rewritten as
V (e∗;w∗,m) = (pi − w∗m)e∗m + γmde∗m m = mA,mP
Replacing the optimal level of effort and the optimal piece rate gives
V (m) =
1
4
[pi + d(γm + αm)]
2 m = mA,mP (8)
As for the unconditional level of effort, the principal’s utility from the contract with project’s
mission m is increasing in both the principal’s valuation for social output and the agent’s
intrinsic motivation for mission m. Which project’s mission maximizes the principal’s utility
depends on the specific value taken by γm and αm, ∀ m = mA,mP . Notice, however, that
the higher is the difference between αmA and αmP , that is, the stronger the agent feels about
his preferred mission, the more likely is V (mA) to be higher than V (mD) and, therefore, the
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more likely should be the principal to let the agent work for his preferred mission. Now, in the
extreme case where αmA = αmP , i.e. the agent is indifferent about the missions or the agent
is not-motivated, the principal is undoubtedly better off by choosing his preferred mission, i.e.
m∗ = mP . Indeed, if the principal cannot take advantage of the substitution channel, there is
no reason why the principal should make a compromise on the mission. Therefore, compared
to a situation where the agent is not intrinsically motivated, if the agent is motivated the
principal should be more likely to offer the contract with the agent’s preferred mission.7 The
last prediction follows:
Prediction 3 Principals should be more likely to compromise on the mission the more the
agents are motivated.
Thus, all together, these predictions 2-3 imply that motivated agents should be compensated
with higher non-monetary incentives and lower monetary incentives than non-motivated agents.
II. The Experiment
The design of the experiment closely follows the theoretical framework described in Section
I. The social output generated by the project is implemented as a donation to a charity that
subjects can generate in addition to their monetary payoffs. The choice of the project’s mission
is implemented as the choice of which charity receives the donation. My identification strategy
of the causal effect of the agents’ intrinsic motivation on the choice of the piece rate and of the
project mission is the comparison between the contracts offered to motivated agents and the
contracts offered if the agents were constrained to behave as if they were not motivated. To do
so, I run the two treatments described in Section II.3.
II.1. Recruitment
The implementation described above only works if subjects care about different charities. If this
were not the case, the choice of the project mission, i.e. the choice of which charity receives the
donation, would not entail any trade-off for the principal. Thus, the question whether the choice
of the project mission is treated as substitute to monetary incentives could not be addressed.
To generate such pool of subjects, in the recruitment process students were informed that they
may earn slightly less than usual in experiments but that they would be given the opportunity
7In a setting where m is continuous, the model would predict that the higher the agent’s intrinsic motivation,
the larger the compromise that the principal would make on the project mission (Cassar, 2014).
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to generate a substantial donation to their favorite charity. Furthermore, in order to sign up,
subjects had to specify the name and the website of their favorite charity. This recruitment
procedure turned out to be successful as 92 different charities were chosen by 146 subjects. As
soon as the subjects arrived in the laboratory, they received a list of all the charities that were
chosen by subjects participating in the same experimental session. The list also specified the
number of subjects choosing the same charity. Therefore, subjects knew the full distribution of
charities choices.
In order to have updated information about subjects’ charity preferences, at the beginning
of the experiment subjects were asked to choose (again) their preferred charity from the list.
Subjects’ specific charity preferences were, however, kept confidential throughout the experi-
ment. In other words, subjects knew that all the preferred charities of other subjects must be
in the list but, when interacting with another subject, they did not know which specific charity
in the list that other subject had chosen. As it will become clearer in the next section, this
design choice had several advantages, including avoiding the risk, ex-ante, of matching subjects
with preferences for the same charity.
II.2. Experimental design
After the instructions were read aloud, half of the subjects were assigned to the role of principals,
the other half the role of agents. The same role was kept throughout the experiment, which
consisted of multiple periods. At the beginning of each period, every agent was randomly and
anonymously re-matched to a principal.
In each period, the sequence of actions was as follows. The principal chose a piece rate w
in the integer set {1, 2, .., 9}, and whether to offer a closed or an open contract. If the closed
contract was offered, the effort exerted by the agent generated, in addition to the principal’s
profit, a donation to the principal’s preferred charity. If the open contract was offered, the
effort exerted by the agent generated, in addition to the principal’s profit, a donation to the
agent’s preferred charity. Thus, in terms of the model described in Section I, the closed contract
corresponds to the choice of a project mission equal to mP , while the open contract corresponds
to the choice of a project mission equal mA.
The agent then chose a costly level of effort e in the integer set {1, 2, .., 9} which determined
payoffs and donations in that period. To rule out binding budget constraints, at the beginning
of each period every agent was endowed with 35 points. This allowed the agent to exert the
maximum level of effort even if the principal chose a piece rate of 1. Both the principal’s profit
and the level of donation depended linearly on effort as in (3) and (4). Specifically, pi = 10
and d = 20. This choice of parameters, along with the convex effort function, ensured that it
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was not convenient neither for the principal nor for the agent to maximize own income and
donate later. Finally, at the beginning of each period a base income of 20 points was given to
every principal in order to get roughly the same monetary payoffs under the optimal choices
for agents and principals who did not care about charities, i.e. for e = w = 5 in both contracts.
As subjects may vary in the extent to which they care about the charities and this is not
observable, the strategy method was necessary to elicit the principal’s choice of piece rate and
the agent’s choice of effort for both the closed and open contract. More specifically, I elicited
the agent’s effort choice for each possible piece rate in each contract. To elicit the principal’s
beliefs about the agent’s effort, the principal also specified an expected level of effort for each
of the two contracts given the chosen piece rate. This elicitation was, however, not incentivized
and the expected effort level was not revealed to the agent. The principal would then choose
which contract, between the open and the closed, to offer to the agent. The chosen contract
was implemented with 75% probability, whereas with 25% probability the other contract was
implemented. This random implementation of contracts was necessary to make the choice of
piece rate incentive compatible even in the principal’s least preferred contract. Furthermore, the
fact that agents did not know with certainty whether the implemented contract corresponded to
the contract chosen by the principal, and that the agents’ effort in each contract was elicited ex-
ante through the strategy method, make it very unlikely that the agents reciprocated principals
who chose to offer the open contract.8 At the end of each period, payoffs realized and became
observable to the principal and the agent. To improve learning, the principal observed not only
the level of effort and the donation realized, but also the level of effort chosen by the agent in
the contract that was not implemented. Similarly, at the end of each period, the agent observed
not only the piece rate offered in the implemented contract, but also the piece rate offered in
the remaining contract. He also observed which of the two contracts the principal had chosen
to offer. Principals and agents were then randomly re-matched.
As pointed out earlier, neither the principals nor the agents were revealed the preferred
charity of the subjects they were matched with. It follows that the principal’s choice between
the closed and the open contract was equivalent to a choice between a contract that generated
a donation to his preferred mission with certainty and a contract that generates a donation to
any of the charity specified in the list with some probability.9 Similarly, an agent knew that
8Reciprocity towards the choice of the open contract would have, indeed, the same implications as an increase
in αmA , so it could have acted as a potential confound. On the contrary, note that reciprocity towards high
wages, by reducing the principal’s benefit from saving on monetary incentives, works against my hypothesis.
Similarly, reciprocity only towards high wages in the open contract leads to the opposite prediction regarding
the optimal choice of wages, namely, the principal may want to set higher wages in the open contract than in
the closed contract.
9This probability was known to the subjects because, as mentioned above, they knew the full distribution of
charity choices.
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his effort level in the closed contract would generate a donation to any charity specified in the
list with a given probability, whereas his effort level in the open contract would generate a
donation to his preferred charity with certainty. Thus, everything else being equal, it is clear
that the principal’s valuation of social output was higher under the closed contract while the
agent’s motivation was higher under the open contract. Theoretical predictions were, therefore,
unchanged.
While this design feature did not affect the theoretical predictions, it had two main advan-
tages. First, this design avoided the risk, ex-ante, of having too many pairs of principal-agent
preferring the same charity. Second, it eliminated any heterogeneity across periods and treat-
ments in the agent’s intrinsic motivation under the closed contract and in the principal’s valua-
tion of output in the open contract. In terms of the model, this was equivalent to keeping αmP
and γmA of each individual constant across periods and treatments. Indeed, such unobservable
heterogeneity across periods and treatments could have added substantial noise to the data and
acted as a potential confound.
II.3. Treatments
The experiment involved two treatments. Each subject participated in both treatments. In the
main treatment the agent was free to choose any desired level of effort. As shown in equation
(5), if the agent cared about the charity he would choose an effort level that is higher than
the piece rate offered in the contract. In the control treatment, the agent was not allowed to
exert more effort than the level that maximized his material payoff. That is, the level of effort
could not be higher than the piece rate specified in the contract. In this treatment any effort
premium from agents’ intrinsic motivation was, therefore, ruled out.
To keep the notation consistent with the theory described in Section I, let wmA and emA be,
respectively, the piece rate and the effort level chosen in the open contract, while let wmP and
emP be, respectively, the piece rate and the effort level chosen in the closed contract. Treatment
variations are summarized in Table I.
Table I: Treatment variation
Treatment Effort
Main emA ∈ {1, 2.., 9} ; emP ∈ {1, 2.., 9}
Control emA ≤ wmA ; emP ≤ wmP
To ensure that both the principals and the agents understood the payoff implications of
their choices, a payoff table was given in the instructions where, in red, was the effort choice
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that maximizes the agent’s income for any given piece rate - thus, the table diagonal was in
red - and, in blue, was the effort choice that maximizes the donation for any given piece rate,
i.e. an effort level of 9 for any given piece rate. Thus, based on this payoff table, it was clear
to both the principals and the agents that if the latter cared about the charity, in the main
treatment they would choose a higher effort level than the piece rate.
Six sessions were run in total. To control for potential order effects, the order in which
the two treatments were played were systematically modified across sessions. Each treatment
lasted 10 periods. So overall, every subject made decisions for 20 periods. Payments to subjects
and donations to charities were made according to the outcome of one out of the 20 periods
selected at random.
II.4. Elicitation of Preferences over Charities
It is important to point out that subjects are likely to have heterogenous preferences over the
charities. In terms of the model, this means that the agent’s parameters αmA and αmP and
the principal’s parameters γmP and γmA are individual specific. Therefore, to add control and
run robustness checks, it is useful to get an independent measure of these parameters at an
individual level.
For this purpose, I use an allocation game with concave allocation function. At the end of
the experiment, but before the subjects knew which period had been randomly selected to count
for payments and donations, subjects were asked to allocate 40 points between themselves, their
preferred charity, and a charity selected at random from the list. At the time of making the
decision, however, subjects did not know which charity would be randomly selected from the list.
So their information was analogous to the information they had when making decisions during
the experiment. Let’s define pij as the number of points allocated by subject i to a particular
recipient j. To induce non-linearity and avoid corner solutions, we apply the following non-
linear transformation to the payoff of recipient j: Pij = 7 ∗
√
pij. That is, recipient j receives
a payoff of Pij points if subject i allocates pij points to him/her. Since every subject must
allocate all 40 points, it follows that
∑
j pij = 40 ∀i.
According to this allocation function, any subject who cares about his preferred charity, i.e.
any agent with αmA > 0 or any principal with γmP > 0, should allocate some points to his/her
preferred charity. The optimal number of points allocated to the preferred charity is increasing
in αmA , or equivalently in γmP . Similarly, any subject who cares about the charities in the list
as a whole, i.e. any agent with αmP > 0 or any principal with γmA > 0, should allocate some
points to the random charity. The optimal number of points allocated to the random charity
is increasing in αmP for the agents, or equivalently in γmA for the principals.
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The advantage of using an allocation game with concave allocation function is that it rules
out potential corner solutions that may arise from efficiency concerns. So this method generates
an approximate measure at an individual level of (i) the intensity with which subjects care
about their preferred charities, i.e. of the size of αmA and γmP ; (ii) the importance of subjects’
preferred mission compared to other missions, i.e. αmA − αmP and γmP − γmA . The latter
measures to what extent a principal, or an agent, is mission-driven and is particularly relevant
for comparative statics across types of contract.
II.5. Questionnaire on fairness
Finally, at the end of the experiment subjects answered a very short questionnaire. The pur-
pose of the questionnaire was to elicit subjects’ fairness perceptions about the substitutability
between monetary and non-monetary compensations. Previous survey evidence by Kahneman
et al. (1986) reveals, indeed, that fairness considerations may affect wage-setting decisions.
More specifically, subjects were asked the following two questions: i) “Suppose you run an
organization with two employees: employee A and employee B. These employees are assigned
the exact same task. Furthermore, they are identical in every aspect: in particular, they have
the same ability and are equally productive. There is only one difference: employee A enjoys
the task more than employee B does. Would you pay them the same wage?” Subjects could
choose between three options: “same wage”, a “higher wage to employee A”, and a “higher
wage to employee B”; ii) “Suppose you run an organization and you are in the process of hiring
a new employee. During the job interview, you realize that the candidate for the position would
really enjoy the job so he/she would accept to do the same amount of work even for a lower
wage than the one you initially planned to offer. Would you offer the candidate a lower wage
than the one you initially planned?” After having answered this question, subjects were asked
whether they thought it was fair to offer a lower wage.
II.6. Procedural details
Overall 146 subjects participated in six sessions, 73 in the role of principals and 73 in the role of
agents. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Our subject pool consisted primarily of students at the University of Zurich and at the
Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich and were recruited using the software hroot (Bock
et al., 2012). Subjects were paid based on the number of points generated in one period selected
at random from the experiment and based on the number of points they allocated to themselves
in the allocation game. Donations to charities were also made accordingly. In addition, each
subject received a show-up fee of 10 SFr. On average, an experimental session lasted 1 hour
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and 45 minutes. The average payment was 35 SFr and the average donation was 36 SFr per
pair of subjects.
II.7. Hypotheses
The analysis of the theoretical model in Section I generates a set of predictions that I now
restate as hypotheses to be tested in the experiment.
First, the model predicts that conditional on piece rate, the effort premium from agents’
intrinsic motivation is higher in contracts with the agents’ preferred mission. Prediction 1
translates to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 In the main treatment, conditional on piece rate, effort is higher in the open
contract than in the closed contract. Furthermore, effort in the main treatment should be higher
than in the control treatment.
This first hypothesis tests if the project mission is effective in motivating effort provision. Notice
that this hypothesis needs to be satisfied in order to test the remaining hypotheses.
Next, conditional on the hypothesis above being satisfied, the model makes predictions
about the level of piece rate offered by principals. Specifically, it predicts that wages are higher
in contracts with the principals’ preferred mission. Indeed, in such contracts, there is (i) a
stronger preference channel: the principal wants to elicit a higher donation for his preferred
charity than for any other charity; (ii) a weaker substitution channel: the agent needs higher
monetary incentives to provide effort for the principals’ preferred charity than for his own
preferred charity. Prediction 2a translates to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Wages are higher in the closed contract than in the open contract.
This second hypothesis tests if, contrary to the results in Gerhards (2013), there is a negative
correlation between financial incentives and the alignment of the project mission with the
agents’ mission preferences. Testing this hypothesis alone, however, can not answer whether
principals take advantage of the agents’ intrinsic motivation by saving on monetary incentives.
To address this question, I need to disentangle the substitution channel from the preference
channel. My identification strategy is to compare the piece rate offered by principals within a
specific type of contract across the two treatments. By comparing wages within the same type of
contract, the preference channel is constant, and therefore, any observed piece rate differential
across treatments must come from the substitution channel: while the substitution channel
should be active in the main treatment, in the control treatment, since the effort premium from
15
intrinsic motivation is ruled out by design, the substitution channel is switched off. This is
equivalent to Prediction 2b, which translates to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Conditional on the type of contract, wages are lower in the main treatment than
in the control treatment.
This hypothesis tests if, given a certain project mission, the principal takes advantage of the
agent’s intrinsic motivation to work for that mission by lowering the piece rate. In other words,
this tests if the principal would pay a motivated agent a lower piece rate than a non-motivated
agent.
The size of the substitution channel will depend, of course, on the size of the effort pre-
mium resulting from the agent’s intrinsic motivation in Hypothesis 1. Since I expect the effort
premium to be higher if the agent works for his preferred mission, the next hypothesis follows
from Prediction 2.iii:
Hypothesis 4 The piece rate differential across treatments is higher in the open contract than
in the closed contract.
Finally, the model makes predictions about the principal’s choice of the project’s mission.
More specifically, if the agent is not motivated, the principal has no reason to choose a different
mission from his preferred one. On the contrary, if the agent is motivated, the principal may
want to compromise on the mission in order to save on monetary incentives. The next hypothesis
follows from Prediction 3:
Hypothesis 5 The principal is more likely to offer the open contract in the main treatment
than in the control treatment.
Hypotheses 3-5 together test if the principal treats the choice of the project mission as a
substitute for monetary incentives in motivating effort provision.
III. Results
I start by describing the results from the allocation game to test whether the recruitment
process was successful in generating the right pool of subjects. These results will also be used
for robustness checks in the subsequent analyses. I then report the agents’ effort choices. Indeed,
in order to address the central question of this paper, it is necessary to find the predicted effort
differences across contracts and treatments. Finally, I turn to the central part of this paper,
namely, to the principals’ choices of piece rates and contracts.
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III.1. Descriptive statistics from the allocation game
The results from the allocation game are illustrated in Figure I. Recall that the subjects had
to allocate 40 points between themselves, their preferred charity, and one charity in the list
selected at random. The figure shows the number of points allocated by subjects to their
preferred charity and to the random charity in the list. By subtracting these numbers from
the 40 points endowment, one can infer how many points subjects kept for themselves. Circles
below (above) the 45-degree line indicate higher (lower) number of points allocated to one’s
preferred charity compared to the random charity. Circles below (above) the line y = 20 − x
indicate higher (lower) number of points allocated to oneself compared to both the charities.
The size of the circles reflect the number of observations. The biggest circle represents 16
observations while the smallest circle represents one observation.
As can be seen, with the exception of one subject, all other subjects allocated equal or more
points to their preferred charity than to the random charity in the list. Furthermore, only a
minority of subjects, approximately 11 percent, acted as a pure profit maximizers by keeping
all the money for themselves. Roughly a fifth of the subjects seemed to be indifferent between
all charities in the list.
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Figure I: Allocation Choices
While this is only an approximation of subjects’ preferences over charities, and taking into
account that these preferences were elicited only at the end of experiment, it still provides some
informative evidence that, overall: i) Subjects cared about the charities; ii) The charities were
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not perfect substitutes, but subjects strictly preferred their chosen charity. Thus, the recruit-
ment process was successful in generating the right pool of subjects to address the questions of
this paper.
III.2. Agents’ effort choices
I start by analyzing the agents’ effort choices for different wages and contracts in the two
treatments. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I find:
Result 1 Within the main treatment, effort is higher in the open contract than in the closed
contract. And for both types of contract, effort in the main treatment is higher than in the
control treatment.
Evidence for Result 1 can be seen in Figure II. This figure shows the effort choices per piece
rate and type of contract elicited through the strategy method in each treatment. The black
line represents the 45 degrees line. Thus, any point on the right of the black line corresponds
to a (positive) effort premium from intrinsic motivation.
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Figure II: Effort Choices
As predicted, because of the imposed restriction on the agents’ choice set, in the control
treatment the average effort in both contracts is equal or slightly lower than the piece rate.
On the contrary, in the main treatment average effort in both contracts is always higher than
the piece rate - with the obvious exception for a piece rate equal to 9. Furthermore, within
the main treatment, for any given piece rate average effort is roughly half unit higher in the
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open contract than in the closed contract. To assess the statistical significance of these effort
differences, I use the one-sided clustered version of the signed-rank test proposed by Datta
and Satten (2008), which controls for potential dependencies between observations. Within
the main treatment, for each given piece rate, individual and period, I calculate the difference
between the effort choice in the open contract and in the closed contract. This generates 10
observations per subject, per piece rate. Clustering at the individual level, I find that for any
piece rate level, the effort choice in the open contract is significantly higher than in the closed
contract (p < 0.01). Using the same test to assess the statistical significance of the effort
differences across treatments, I find that for any piece rate level in a specific type of contract,
the effort choice in the main treatment is significantly higher than the effort choice in the control
treatment - and also higher than the piece rate (p < 0.01). This holds for both the open and
the closed contract.10
Table II: Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
effort piece rate open contract beliefs effort
piece rate 0.942*** 0.686***
(0.014) (0.050)
piece rate*open –0.014 –0.053
(0.008) (0.035)
open contract 0.179*** –0.755*** 0.137
(0.046) (0.156) (0.224)
main treatment 0.510*** –0.684*** 0.116*** 0.309***
(0.109) (0.131) (0.029) (0.091)
main*open 0.422*** 0.056 0.703***
(0.083) (0.149) (0.118)
constant 0.041 6.041*** 0.298*** 1.520***
(0.088) (0.152) (0.042) (0.299)
Round FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session FE? No No No No
Individual FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.878 0.125 0.024 0.468
Observations 26280 2920 1460 2920
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. All regressions use a fixed-effect model. The dependent
variables in regression (1), (2), (3), (4) are, respectively, the agent’s effort level, the principal’s belief about the
agent’s effort level, the piece rate offered by the principal, the type of contract chosen by the principal. More
specifically, in regression (4), the dependent variable equals “1” if principals chooses the open contract and “0”
if the principal chooses the closed. Significance levels: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
10Figures A.1-A.9 in the Appendix also report, for any given piece rate, the time path of the effort level chosen
in the open and in the closed contracts across treatments. It can be seen that Result 1 is robust throughout
the time periods and wages - with the exception, of course, for the piece rate equal to 9 where there can’t be
any effort premium from intrinsic motivation.
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Similar results are found in the OLS regression, which is reported in Table II. It can been seen
from regression (1) that conditional on piece rate, average effort is 0.51 unit points significantly
higher in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Furthermore, as shown in the
interaction of main treatment and open contract, this treatment difference is 0.42 unit points
significantly higher in the open contract than in the closed contract. Thus, the overall effort
premium from being matched with a motivated agent who works for his preferred mission is
almost one additional unit of effort.11 Results are robust to using a Tobit model, to clustering
at the session level, or to restricting attention to the first period only, i.e., where potential
spillover effects are fully ruled out.
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Figure III: Average effort in the main treatment by different agents
Finally, Figure III uses data from the allocation game to distinguish between the effort levels
chosen by agents with different charity preferences. As Hypothesis 1 relies on the assumption
that agents care more about their chosen charity than about any other charity in the list, i.e.
αmA > αmP , I distinguish between those agents whom I define as mission driven, i.e. those
who, in the allocation game, allocated more points to their preferred charity than to the random
charity, and those who are not mission driven, i.e. who allocated the same number of points,
including 0, to their preferred charity and to the random charity. As can be seen, in the main
treatment, for any given piece rate, the difference in effort levels between the open and the
closed contract is approximately half a unit larger for agents who are mission-driven than for
11Note that if subjects in the control treatment were really non-motivated, the coefficient on the variable
open contract should not be significant, as they would not care about any charity. So this is probably due to a
minority of workers who disliked some charities in the list, and therefore, in the control treatment and closed
contract they chose a level of effort lower than the piece rate. This has no implication for the interpretation of
the results, because if anything, it should make it harder to find a treatment effect.
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those who are not. For the latter, this difference almost disappears. Not surprisingly, the
mission of a job is not an effective incentive tool if agents are not motivated or if they don’t
have specific mission preferences.
These results show that, overall, agents were motivated to generate a donation to a charity,
but more so if the donation was directed to their preferred charity rather than to the preferred
charity of the principal.
III.3. Principals’ piece rate choices
I now analyze the piece rate offered by principals in different contracts and treatments. Con-
sistent with Hypothesis 2, I find that:
Result 2 Wages are higher in the closed contract than in the open contract.
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Figure IV: Piece rate choices
Evidence for Result 2 can be seen in Figure IV. This figure compares the average piece rate
offered across treatments and contracts. It can be seen that in both treatments, the average
piece rate in the closed contract is higher than in the open contract (signed-rank test with
clusters p < 0.01). Notice, furthermore, that this piece rate differential should be higher for
principals who are mission-driven (γmP > γmA) than for those who are not (γmP = γmA).
Indeed, since the latter do not care about the charities, or are indifferent between them, the
preference channel will not be higher in the closed contract. Consistent with this argument,
Figure V shows that the piece rate differential between contracts is approximately 0.6 units
higher for mission-driven principals than for principals who are not mission-driven (rank-sum
test with clusters p < 0.05).
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Figure V: Piece rate choices by different principals
Figure IV also reveals the first main result of this paper. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, I
find:
Result 3 For both types of contract, wages are lower in the main treatment than in the control
treatment.
It can be seen that in both the open and the closed contract, the average piece rate in the control
treatment is approximately 0.7 unit points (or 14 percent) higher than in the main treatment.
Both these differences are highly significant (signed-rank with clusters p < 0.01). Since the
preference channel is constant within the same type of contract, these piece rate differentials
between treatments identify the substitution channel. Thus, this result shows that principals
take advantage of agents’ intrinsic motivation by lowering the piece rate by approximately 14
percent.12
Another important observation to take from Figure IV, however, is that the piece rate dif-
ferential between treatments is the same in both types of contract. This is confirmed by the
signed-rank test with clusters. So in others words, in contrast with the theoretical predic-
12One possible alternative interpretation of the result that wages in the open contract are higher in the
main treatment than in control treatment could be that principals care about the agents and do not want to
prevent them from generating a high donation to their favorite charity by setting a low piece rate in the control
treatment. Indeed, recall that the piece rate offered by the principal acts as an upper-bound on the effort that
the agent can exert and, thus, on the donation that can be generated. This interpretation, however, cannot
explain the piece rate difference across treatments that is found in the closed contract, where the donation
is directed to the principal’s preferred charity. Furthermore, if one believes that in the allocation game, the
number of points allocated by a principal to the preferred charity of a subject taken at random is correlated
with how much a principal may care about other subjects - and thus about the agents-, I find that Result 3
does not change when I distinguish between principals who allocated some points to the random charity and
those who did not. The results are available upon request.
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tions, the substitution channel is not higher in the open contract than in the closed contract.
Hypothesis 4 is, therefore, rejected.
Result 4 There is no difference in the piece rate differential between treatments across the two
contracts.
Similar results are found in regression (3) in Table II. It can be seen that wages in the open
contract are 0.76 unit point significantly lower than in the closed contract. Furthermore, wages
in the main treatment are 0.68 unit point lower than in the control treatment. Both these
differences are highly significant. The interaction between open contract and main treatment
is, however, positive and insignificant. This confirms that the treatment effect is the same in
both contracts. Explanations for this result are discussed in Section IV. Again, results are
robust to using a Tobit model, to clustering at the session level, or to restricting attention to
the first period only, where potential spillover effects are fully ruled out.13
III.4. Principals’ contract choices
Next, I analyze the principals’ contract choices across treatments. Consistent with Hypothesis
5, I find:
Result 5 The open contract is more frequently offered in the main treatment than in the control
treatment.
Evidence for Result 5 can be see in the left of Figure VI. In the main treatment the open
contract is offered approximately 40 percent of the time, whereas in the control treatment the
open contract is offered approximately 28 percent of the times.14 This difference is highly
significant (signed-rank test with clusters p < 0.01).
Additional evidence for Result 5 can be found in the regression (4) reported in Table II. It
can be seen that the probability of the open contract being offered is approximately 12 percent
higher in the main treatment than in the control treatment (p < 0.01). The marginal effect
from a Probit model gives the same result.15
13Figure A.10 in the Appendix also reports the time path of the piece rate offered in the open and in the
closed contracts across treatments. It can be seen that throughout all time periods, for both types of contracts,
wages are higher in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Furthermore, within each treatment,
wages are higher in the closed contract than in the open contract.
14Notice that based on the predictions from standard contract theory models, the principal should never offer
the open contract in the control treatment. Indeed, as any effort premium is ruled out by design, there is no
reason to offer the open contract in the control treatment. Thus, this result is probably driven by some of social
preferences of the principals towards the agents.
15Figure A.11 in the Appendix also reports the time path of the contract choice across treatments. It can be
seen that, with the exception of the first period, the frequency of open contracts being offered is always higher
in the main treatment than in the control treatment.
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Figure VI: Contract choices by treatment and different principals
Finally, notice that principals who are not mission-driven should be more likely to offer the
open contract than principals who are mission-driven. Indeed, since the formers are indifferent
between the charities, they don’t make any mission compromise by letting the agents generate
a donation to their preferred charity. The right side of Figure VI shows exactly this. Open
contracts are offered 10 percent more frequently by principals who are not mission-driven than
by principals who are mission-driven. However, this difference is not significant (rank-sum test
with clusters p = 0.110).
Results 3 and 5 together provide evidence that principals treat the choice of the project
mission as substitute for monetary incentives. Motivated agents are more likely to work for
their preferred missions and are paid less. This answers the central question of the paper.
III.5. Realized effort, piece rate and profit
I now turn my attention to the realized effort and piece rate choices. As it can be seen in Figure
A.12, the average realized effort is approximately equal to 6 in both treatments. This means
that, on average, the same amount of donation was generated across treatments. However,
as it also appears in Figure A.12, the average realized piece rate is approximately 10 percent
lower in the main treatment than in the control treatment. Thus, in the main treatment,
principals were able to replace monetary incentives with non-monetary incentives, i.e., with
letting the agents work for their preferred charities, and still induce the same level of effort as
in the control treatment. As it can be seen in Figure A.13, these financial savings from agents’
intrinsic motivation increases principals’ average profit in the main treatment by approximately
10 percent compared to the control treatment. On the contrary, agents’ average income is
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approximately 9 percent lower in the main treatment than in the control treatment.
IV. Discussion
Result 4 contradicts the theoretical predictions from section I. Surprisingly, the piece rate
differential between treatments is not higher in the open contract than in the closed contract.
However, given that the agents’ intrinsic motivation is higher under the open contract, the
amount that a principal can save in terms of piece rate from being matched with a motivated
agent should be higher under the open contract than under the closed contract. Why is this
not the case?
Based on Figure A.14 in the appendix and regression (4) in Table II, this does not seem
to depend on principals’ erroneous beliefs about agents’ intrinsic motivation, as the formers
correctly anticipate a higher effort premium in the open contract than in the closed contract
for any given piece rate. It can been seen from regression (4) that conditional on the piece
rate, average expected effort is 0.3 unit points significantly higher in the main treatment than
in the control treatment. Furthermore, as suggested by the coefficient of the interaction term,
this treatment difference is 0.7 unit points significantly higher in the open contract than in the
closed contract. So, consistent with the actual agents’ effort choices, the overall expected effort
premium from being matched with a motivated agent who work for his preferred mission is
approximately one additional unit of effort. Hence, principals correctly anticipate that agents’
are intrinsically motivated to generate a donation to a charity, particularly so in the open
contract.
A potential explanation, consistent with the data, is that many principals may be sacrificing
profits in the open contract because they are reluctant to offer a piece rate below what I call
the standard piece rate, that is, the piece rate that a principal would offer if neither him nor the
agent cared about the charities, namely, if γm = αm = 0, i ∈ {A,D}. Given the parameters
chosen in the experiment, this corresponds to a piece rate of 5. Notice, that based on equation
(6), in the main treatment the piece rate offered by the principals in the open contract should
be, on average, lower than the standard piece rate. Indeed, αmA should be, on average, higher
that γmA , and therefore, in the main treatment the average piece rate in the open contract
should be lower than 5.16 Importantly, as it is evident from equation (6), the same predictions
do not hold for the closed contract. The reason is that in such contracts principals are more
16This is confirmed by the data from the allocation game. On average, agents allocate to their preferred
charity more than twice (10 points) as much as the principals allocate to a random charity in the list (4.3
points).
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motivated than the agents to generate a donation, as the latter is made to their preferred
charity. That is, γmP should be, on average, higher that αmP .
17 Similarly, since in the control
treatment the substitution channel is switched off, the piece rate should never be lower than 5
in neither type of contracts. Thus, if, as I hypothesize, such fairness constraint exists, it would
only be binding for the open contract in the main treatment, but not in the closed contract nor
in the control treatment.
Consistent with this argument, as shown in Figure IV, in the control treatment or in the
closed contract, the average piece rate is significantly higher than 5, whereas in the open contract
in the main treatment the average piece rate is just equal to 5. A similar picture emerges if we
look at the distribution of wages chosen in different treatments and contracts (Figure A.15).
While the frequency of wages below 5 in the open contract in the main treatment (30 percent)
is significantly higher than in the closed contract (17 percent) or than in the control treatment
(11 percent), it is still quite low compared to the theoretical predictions. I, therefore, conjecture
that principals are reluctant to set a piece rate below the standard piece rate.
Taking this conjecture as given, the next question is why are the principals reluctant to set
a piece rate below the standard piece rate. Inequity aversion as defined in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) does not seem to be the reason because, given the parameters chosen in the experiment,
inequity averse principals would prefer wages that are equal or lower than the standard piece
rate, but not higher. Neither is there evidence, from Figure II or Figure A.14, of negative
reciprocity nor of expected negative reciprocity by principals with respect to wages below the
standard piece rate in the open contract.18
Such reluctance seems related to a different fairness standard: offering a piece rate below
the standard piece rate is a clear sign of exploiting workers’ intrinsic motivation, and therefore,
many principals who consider this to be unfair are more reluctant to lower the piece rate beyond
that level. Subjects’ responses to a survey conducted at the end of the experimental study are
consistent with this argument. When asked if, in the role of employers during a job interview,
they would offer a lower piece rate than the one they initially thought to offer if they realized
that the job candidate would really enjoy doing this job, only 22 subjects replied they would
offer a lower piece rate, while 124 subjects replied they would not offer a lower piece rate, most
of them for fairness reasons.
By matching subjects’ survey responses with the decisions made in the experiment, I get the
17This also is confirmed by the data from the allocation game. On average, principals allocate to their
preferred charity almost 3 times (11.7 points) as much as the agents allocate to a random charity in the list (4
points).
18Given a piece rate below the standard piece rate, only 8 percent of the observed effort levels are lower than
the piece rate offered in the open contract.
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following results. Regressions reported in Table A.1 show that in the main treatment those 14
percent of principals who do not perceive as unfair to offer a lower piece rate to the motivated
job candidate are more likely in the open contract - but not in the closed contract- to offer
a piece rate below the standard piece rate compared to the other principals (p < 0.1). This
difference is equally significant using a clustered version of the rank-sum test proposed by Datta
and Satten (2005). Furthermore, for this sub-sample of principals, Figures A.16 and A.17 show
that: (i) In the main treatment, throughout all time periods, the average piece rate offered in
the open contract is lower than the standard piece rate. (ii) In almost every period, the piece
rate differential between treatments is higher in the open contract than in the closed contract.19
Given the sub-sample small size, and given that the experiment was not designed to test this
specific hypothesis, this interpretation should be, however, taken with caution.
So the overall picture that emerges from this analysis is that principals are heterogeneous
in the extent to which they are willing to take advantage of agents’ intrinsic motivation by
saving on wages. Most principals seemed to be willing to take advantage of agents’ intrinsic
motivation as long as the offered piece rate was still higher or equal than the standard piece
rate. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, only one third of the principals were willing to
offer a motivated agent a piece rate below the standard piece rate in the open contract. These
results provide experimental support for previous survey evidence by Kahneman et al. (1986),
which suggests that fairness considerations can act as a constraint on the employers’ profits. In
this experiment, fairness considerations acted as a limited liability constraint. This constraint
made the substitution between monetary and non-monetary incentives imperfect.
V. Concluding Remarks
Recently, much attention has been devoted to study how agents respond to different monetary
and non-monetary incentives.20. There is no evidence, however, on how principals combine
these incentives in order to induce effort. This paper reports the results from an experiment
that was designed to test, for the first time, how principals write contracts when agents care
about the mission of their job and when the principals have two instruments, the piece rate
and the choice of the project mission, to influence the agents’ effort. Therefore, this study also
created a new paradigm that can be used for future laboratory experiments with motivated
19However, potentially due to the lack of power in such a small sample, I cannot establish statistical signifi-
cance.
20The latter include not only the job mission, but also status incentives and social recognition (Kosfeld and
Neckermann, 2011; Ashraf et al., 2014), corporate social responsibility (Koppel and Regner, 2013), and the job
impact (Kosfeld et al., 2014)
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agents and misaligned mission preferences between principals and agents.
On the whole, my results provide evidence for the validity of the theoretical predictions
from contract theory models with motivated agents (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Delfgaauw and
Dur, 2007; Cassar, 2014). I show that principals take advantage of agents’ intrinsic motivation
by lowering the piece rate and use the choice of the project mission as a substitute to motivate
effort. Because of fairness considerations, however, this substitution remains imperfect.
But, of course, some questions remain open. First, the experiment is designed to test
the validity of such predictions in a fully “neutral” environment, namely, in the absence of
additional features of labor relations that may play a role in a natural environment. In reality,
the matching of employers and workers is not exogenous, but rather, workers and employers
with similar mission preferences will try to match and form a long-term contractual relationship.
This selection and long-term interaction may, of course, enhance the development of social ties
between the employers and the workers and, in turn, increase the effect of fairness considerations
relative to a one-shot game. Whether these stronger fairness considerations would translate into
higher wages or into better alignments of the job mission with the workers’ preferred mission
remains, however, an open question.
Finally, while the experiment did not allow for any competitive forces, in a natural en-
vironment competition between workers plays a crucial role in the determination of wages.
More specifically, competition is likely to act against fairness considerations and reinforce the
substitutability between monetary and non-monetary incentives: why should a non-profit or-
ganization hire a new employee if it can count on the effort of a motivated volunteer who is
willing to work for free? These extensions are left for future work.
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Appendix
Tables
Table A.1: Piece rate choices of principals with different survey responses
(1) (2) (3)
RE Probit RE
fair to pay lower wage 0.205* 0.574* 0.100
(0.123) (0.327) (0.086)
constant 0.386*** –0.323 0.179**
(0.093) (0.271) (0.070)
Round FE? Yes Yes Yes
Session FE? Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE? No No No
Adj. R2
Observations 730 730 730
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Regression (1) and (2) include only observations within
the main treatment and open contract. Regression (3) includes only observations within the main treatment
and closed contract. The dependent variable is binary and takes value 1 if the offered piece rate is below 5 and
value 0 otherwise. The independent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the survey conducted at the
end of the experiment, the principal reported that he would offer a lower wage to a motivated job candidate,
and 0 otherwise. Significance levels: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.
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Figure A.1: Effort over time for a piece rate= 1. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.2: Effort over time for a piece rate= 2. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.3: Effort over time for a piece rate= 3. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.4: Effort over time for a piece rate= 4. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.5: Effort over time for a piece rate= 5. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.6: Effort over time for a piece rate= 6. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
32
6.
5
7
7.
5
8
e
ffo
rt
0 2 4 6 8 10
Round
Open-Main Open-Main
Open-Control Open-Control
Closed-Main Closed-Main
Closed-Control Closed-Control
Figure A.7: Effort over time for a piece rate= 7. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.8: Effort over time for a piece rate= 8. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.9: Effort over time for a piece rate= 9. Averages shown by the dots for the
respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each
type of contract and treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and
treatment.
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Figure A.10: Piece rates over time. Averages shown by the dots for the respective type of
contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each type of contract and
treatment. In total, 73 subjects participated in each type of contract and treatment.
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Figure A.11: Contract choice over time. Averages shown by the dots for the respective
treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines for each treatment. In total, 73 subjects
participated in each treatment.
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Figure A.12: Average realized effort and piece rate
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Figure A.13: Average realized profit
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Figure A.14: Beliefs about effort
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Figure A.15: Piece rate distribution
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Figure A.16: Piece rate difference across contracts for sub-sample of principals. Av-
erage piece rate offered by 14% of principals (n = 10) who, in a survey conducted at the end
of the experiment, said that they would offer a lower wage to motivated job candidate.
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Figure A.17: Piece rates over time for sub-sample of principals. Averages shown by the
dots for the respective type of contract and treatment, quadratic time trend shown by the lines
for each type of contract and treatment. Only observations from the principals who, in the
survey, reported that they would offer a lower wage to a motivated job candidate are included.
In total, 10 subjects participated in each type of contract and treatment.
38
References
Ashraf, N., O. Bandiera, and J. Kelsey (2014). No margin, no mission? a field experiment on
incentives for pro-social tasks. Journal of Public Economics . Forthcoming.
Bahney, B. W., R. K. Iyengar, P. B. Johnston, D. F. Jung, J. N. Shapiro, and H. J. Shatz (2013).
Insurgent compensation: Evidence from iraq. American Economic Review 103 (3), 518–
22.
Bartling, B., E. Fehr, and K. M. Schmidt (2012). Screening, competition, and job design:
Economic origins of good jobs. American Economic Review 102 (2), 834–64.
Bartling, B., E. Fehr, and K. M. Schmidt (2013). Discretion, productivity, and work satisfaction.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169 (1), 4–22.
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The Review of Economic
Studies 70 (3), pp. 489–520.
Besley, T. and M. Ghatak (1999). Public-private partnerships for the provision of public goods:
Theory and an application to ngos. STICERD Development Economics Discussion Paper
Series, DEDPS 17.
Besley, T. and M. Ghatak (2001). Government versus private ownership of public goods.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (4), 1343–1372.
Besley, T. and M. Ghatak (2005). Competition and incentives with motivated agents. American
Economic Review 95 (3), 616–636.
Besley, T. and M. Ghatak (2013). Profit with Purpose? A Theory of Social Enterprise with
Experimental Evidence. Working paper.
Bock, O., A. Nicklisch, and I. Baetge (2012). hroot: Hamburg registration and organization
online tool. H-Lab Working Paper No. 1.
Carpenter, J. and E. Gong (2013). Motivating agents: How much does the mission matter?
Working paper.
Cassar, L. (2014). Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission. Working paper.
Charness, G., R. Cobo-Reyes, N. Jimenez, J. A. Lacomba, and F. Lagos (2012). The hid-
den advantage of delegation: Pareto improvements in a gift exchange game. American
Economic Review 102 (5), 2358–79.
Datta, S. and G. Satten (2005). Rank-sum tests for clustered data. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 471 (1), 908–915.
Datta, S. and G. Satten (2008). A signed-rank test for clustered data. Biometrics 64 (2),
501–507.
39
Delfgaauw, J. and R. Dur (2007). Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 62 (4), 605–624.
Falk, A. and M. Kosfeld (2006). The hidden costs of control. The American Economic Re-
view 96 (5), pp. 1611–1630.
Fehr, E., H. Herz, and T. Wilkening (2013). The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive
effects of power. American Economic Review 103 (4), 1325–59.
Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999, August). A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Coop-
eration. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3), 817–868.
Fehrler, S. and M. Kosfeld (2013). Pro-social missions and worker motivation: An experimental
study. Forthcoming in Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments. Ex-
perimental Economics 10, 171–178.
Gerhards, L. (2013). How (not) to incentivize motivated agents - an expeirment with employees
from a non-profit organization. Working paper.
Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. Thaler (1986). Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market. American Economic Review, American Economic Associa-
tion 76 (4), 728–41.
Koppel, H. and T. Regner (2013). Corporate social responsibility in the work place - experi-
mental evidence on csr from a gift-exchange game. Working Paper.
Kosfeld, M. and S. Neckermann (2011). Getting more work for nothing? symbolic awards and
worker performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (3), 86–99.
Kosfeld, M., S. Neckermann, and X. Yang (2014). Profit with Purpose? A Theory of Social
Enterprise with Experimental Evidence. Working paper.
Nyborg, K. (2014). Is corporate social responsibility associated with lower wages? IZA World
of Labor .
Nyborg, K. and T. Zhang (2013). Is corporate social responsibility associated with lower wages?
Environmental and Resource Economics 55 (1), 107–117.
Pischke, J.-S. (2011). Money and happiness: Evidence from the industry wage structure. NBER
Working Paper No. 17056.
Tonin, M. and M. Vlassopoulos (2014). Corporate Philanthropy and Productivity: Evidence
from an Online Real Effort Experiment. Working paper.
40
